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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I:

The sale was ratified by the plaintiff.

Plaintiff was informed of the pending sale of the partnership property when the first
papers were signed in October, 1991.

He had a conversation with the State highway

representative January 2, 1992 and wrote a letter January 13, 1992 explaining objections to the
transaction, which he apparently understood in detail. The State paid for the property in March,
1992 and paid plaintiff his share in September, 1992 with the detail of the distribution.
Plaintiff cashed his check without protest until six months later when he filed an action
which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. That constitutes ratification.
POINT II.

The present action is barred by the statute of limitations as to fraud.

The Complaint alleges conspiracy, but the basis is fraud and, therefore, §78-1-26(3),
U.C.A., governs. The delay in filing was more than three (3) years and it is, therefore, barred.
POINT III.

The trial court dismissed the Estate of Reed A. Bullock and Cleo H. Bullock as

personal representative of that estate, both because the estate had not been opened and because
there was no showing that there was anything in that estate.

IV

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
The Beatty and Bullock Appellees do not question the jurisdiction of the Appellate Court.
The Appellant in his brief has a Statement of the Issues Presented for Review. Paragraph
1 concerns the State defendants and their defense under Utah Code Annotated §63-30-1, et seq.
Paragraphs 2 and 3 deal with the question of whether the sale of the property involved in the
action was ratified under the facts of the case, which are established and were properly
determined on a Motion for Summary Judgment. Paragraph 4 is the question whether there was
ratification as to the State of Utah and also whether Appellant's partners were released from
liability. It is submitted that the release of Appellant's partners apart from ratification was not
the subject of the Order in this case and is not before this Court. The question of ratification
as it affects the State of Utah is covered by the attorney representing the State of Utah and those
defendants.
Paragraph 5 states, "The standard of review for each of the above issues is for
correctness of the trial court's conclusions. There is no deference given to the trial court's legal
conclusions." We concur with that statement and accept the Court's Findings of Fact on these
issues, which, apparently, the Appellant also does.
The Appellant has made a copy of a Minute Entry as an appendix to his brief. These
Appellees (hereinafter referred to as "Beatty Appellees") submit that the more pertinent
document is the Court's Order of Summary Judgment, which was entered based upon the Minute
Entry. A copy of that Order of Summary Judgment is attached hereto as Addendum 2.
The Appellant confines his argument insofar as these Beatty Appellees are concerned to
the issue of ratification of the sale of the property. If the Court affirms the Judgment on that

1

basis, that will terminate the lawsuit. If the Appellate Court disagrees with the application of
ratification to the sale of the property, there will then be an issue as to the statute of limitations,
which was covered by the Court's Order of Summary Judgment and which was not briefed by
Appellant.
There apparently is no issue remaining as to whether Cleo Bullock was properly named
as a defendant as personal representative of the Estate of Reed A. Bullock and whether there was
any other personal representative of Reed A. Bullock, deceased.
The Order of Summary Judgment reserved issues as to whether there was a written
agreement of limited partnership and whether Cleo H. Bullock and Faye B. Beatty were limited
partners. The said Order also left unresolved Causes of Action 7 and 10 if there was error in
the holding that there was ratification of the sale.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The trial court treated the pleadings as establishing an agreement of limited
partnership with four general partners. The partnership owned property in the mouth of Provo
Canyon, which was bought by the State of Utah. Following negotiations an agreement of sale
was entered into (See R. 42-46), which was objected to by the Plaintiff-Appellant because he had
not been included in the agreement (R).

His objections were stated in the letter dated January

13, 1992, which he addressed to the State Department of Transportation (Addendum 3).
Thereafter, a deed to the property was made; the sale was consummated and the money was paid
by the State of Utah to the partnership. This was in March 1992. In September 1992, the two
active general partners issued a check to the Plaintiff-Appellant on a partnership check in the
amount of $67,198.43 together with a description of the sale price of the property less taxes and
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a showing of how the remainder was divided into four parts, one-fourth for each of the three
general partners and one-fourth to the Plaintiff-Appellant as a general partner, less the payment
of a note plus interest due to Reed Bullock by Plaintiff-Appellant, with a net check to Richard
Bullock (R. 235). Copy is attached as Addendum 4. There was no comment or criticism at the
time that check was deposited in September 1992 until March 1993 when an action was filed in
the Federal District Court by the Plaintiff-Appellant objecting to the sale and seeking to set the
transaction aside and for damages.
The Complaint alleges fraud by the partners who managed the sale and the issue of
statute of limitations as to actions for fraud was raised by these Beatty Appellees and was
affirmatively ruled on by the District Judge in the Order of Summary Judgment (R. 348-352),
copy of which is attached to this brief as Addendum 2.
We, therefore, address three issues:
t.

Did the Plaintiff-Appellant ratify the sale of the Provo Canyon property by his

partners?
%.

Does §78-12-26(3), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), bar all causes of

action except 7 and 10? (See Addendum 1.)
£.

Were the Estate of Reed A. Bullock, deceased, and Cleo H. Bullock as personal

representative of the Reed A. Bullock Estate properly dismissed as defendants?
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DID THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT RATIFY THE SALE OF
THE PROVO CANYON PROPERTY BY HIS PARTNERS?
The Order of Summary Judgment finds that the letter written by Plaintiff-Appellant on
3

January 13, 1992 (erroneously referred to in Finding No. 1 as a letter by Defendants in the
Court's Order) together with the details on the voucher attached to the check delivered to the
Plaintiff-Appellant on about September 10, 1992, fully informed the Plaintiff-Appellant as to the
details of the sale and division of the proceeds, and his failure to take any action for a period
of approximately six months amounted to ratification of the sale.
It thus appears that the Order assumed that the delivery of the check was not, in and of
itself, sufficient to constitute ratification by cashing of the check and that it was important to
show that the Plaintiff-Appellant was fully informed as to the nature of the transaction and that
he failed to do anything about it, thereby indicating his acquiescence, which amounted to
ratification.
The Plaintiff-Appellant cites no case where a check was cashed and the pertinent facts
were known to the person cashing the check and where there was held to be no ratification.
Appellant cites the case of Zions First Nat'l. Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., (S.Ct. 1988)
762 P.2d 1090, three times in his brief. That case involves an action by the bank to compel a
customer to be bound by a note which contained a stamped signature, where checks had been
issued with a stamped signature, where the bank had honored the checks and the note and the
depositor had not repudiated those documents and the stamped signatures. The trial court had
granted summary judgment, noting that the bank's Vice President had said, "Plaintiff does not
know of any specific authorization for Zions First National Bank to accept stamped signatures
on defendant's checks. Also, Clark claimed that Zions cashed several checks with unauthorized
endorsements and that Clark was damaged by all of the above." (P. 1095) The court noted that
there were issues as to whether Clark had exercised reasonable care and promptness and also
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whether the bank's actions were negligent, or were reasonable and were exercised in good faith.
(P. 1098) For that reason, the court ordered a new trial. The court said that ratification was
not the basis of the trial court's ruling but that it might become an issue at the new trial and,
therefore, reviewed the principles of ratification at pages 1098-1100.
The court noted in that case that ratification must be under circumstances of
acquiescence, or that a duty to disaffirm is not exercised, that knowledge of the facts is a prerequisite, and made some specific references to ratification by banks. The court then noted that
the bank had argued that "A principal may not retain the benefits of a contract entered into by
an alleged unauthorized agent and still repudiate the contract," which it says is not entirely
accurate. Neither was it applicable in that case. The court then quoted from Restatement of
Agency as to receipted benefits as an affirmance, which in §98 requires knowledge of the facts
and is ratification "unless at the time of such receipt he repudiates the act." And if he does, his
receipt of the benefits still "constitutes an affirmance at the election of the other party to the
transaction." Then the court quotes §99 of the Restatement of Agency as follows:
Section 99. Retention of Benefits as Affirmance
The retention by a purported principal, with knowledge of the facts and
before he has changed his position, of something which he is not entitled
to retain unless an act purported to be done on his account is affirmed and
to which he makes no claim except through such act, constitutes an
affirmance unless at the time of such retention he repudiates the act. Even
if he repudiates the act, his retention constitutes an affirmance at the
election of the other party to the transaction. (P. 1099 (emphasis
added)
The court then quotes from Floor v. Mitchell, 86 Utah 203 at 217, 41 P.2d 281 at 287
(1935), as follows:
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When a principal claims the benefits of a contract made by his agent, he
cannot repudiate the acts of this agent on the ground such acts were
unauthorized. Accepting a contract and claiming the fruits thereof, the
principal takes with whatever taint attaches to its origin. (86 Utah at 217)
As to knowledge of the facts, the Court is referred to Exhibit B pages 1-4 (R42-49),
which consists of the contract dated in November, 1991, the offer to purchase the right of way,
a full description of the preliminary contract dated October 25, 1991, an illegible copy of a legal
description and a copy of an agreement of easement prepared in February 1988 (Addendum 5).
It thus appears that Plaintiff-Appellant was folly informed as to the nature of the transaction and
his only objection, in his letter of January 13, 1992, was that he wasn't being included as a
signer. He was not objecting to sale of the property, as he concluded 'so that hopefully a sale
to the state of Utah can be effectuated." His letter also refers to an earlier conversation on
January 2, 1992 where they discussed "the documentation agreeing to sell the Provo Canyon real
property
to the State of Utah." (R. 47)
The Appellant also cites Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74 (Utah 1982), where the court
held that there was no ratification of a sale of property by an agent to eight grantees where two
of the grantees had no notice of the agreement until they saw the deeds and where the statute
of frauds was applied as requiring that an agent executing a deed to convey property must have
authority in writing, which the agent did not have. The court held that ratification was not
shown and that the trial court was in error, and noted that a proper ratification is binding and
can't be revoked and then stated:
However, a ratification requires a principal to have knowledge of all
material facts and an intent to ratify. Jones v. Mutual Creamery Co., 81
Utah 223, 17 P.2d 256 (1932). Under some circumstances failure to
6

disaffirm may constitute ratification of the agent's acts. In quoting 1
Williston on Contracts 805 (Rev.ed.), this Court stated in Moses v. Archie
McFarland & Son, 119 Utah at 607, 230 P.2d 15 573-574 (emphasis
added):
Ratification like original authority need not be express. Any conduct
which indicates assent by the purported principal to become a party to the
transaction or which is justifiable only if there is ratification is sufficient.
Even silence with full knowledge of the facts may manifest affirmance and
thus operate as a ratification. The person with whom the agent dealt with
will so obviously be deceived by assuming the professed agent was
authorized to act as such, that the principal is under a duty to undeceive
him. ... So a purported principal may not be wilfully ignorant, nor may
he purposely shut his eyes to means of information within his possession
and control and thereby escape ratification 'if the circumstances are such
that he could reasonably have been expected to dissent unless he were
willing to be a party to the transaction/ . . . (P. 78)
Appellant also cites Lowe v. April Industries, Inc., 531 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1974) under the
statement that "Intent to ratify can be implied when a duty to disaffirm is not promptly
exercised." We agree that that is a sound statement of the law and it is confirmed by Lowe,
supra, where it was held that there was ratification because there had been no disaffirmance.
That court held that there was proper disclosure contained in a shareholder report and the court
thus stated the rule:
Ratification is expressed or implied. Implied, where it arises under
circumstances of acquiescence or where a duty to disaffirm is not
promptly exercised. Knowledge, usually, is a requisite to any form of
ratification. (1299)
Cove View Excavating and Construction Co v. Flynn, 758 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah App.
1988), is a case involving accord and satisfaction based on acceptance of a check which had an
endorsement on the back that it was full payment, which endorsement was crossed out and the
check cashed. The trial court had held that this did not satisfy the debt. The Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court and said:
7

In light of the express condition on the check, the fact that Grundy did not
subjectively intend to accept the check as full payment of Flynn's
obligation is legally irrelevant. A creditor may not disregard the condition
attached to a check tendered in full payment of an unliquidated or disputed
claim. Marton Remodeling, 706 P. 2d at 609. Grundy's options were to
accept the check on Flynn's terms or return it. . . . His negotiation of
Flynn's check was an acceptance of Flynn's offer of full payment,
notwithstanding his lack of any actual intent to accept it as such.
The letter from Appellant to Alan W. Deardon dated January 13, 1992, which is attached
as Addendum 3, shows that the Plaintiff-Appellant was well acquainted with the transaction that
was pending, what property was sold, what the status of the partnership was and that the
property in Provo Canyon involved all of the partnership's assets, and concludes with the
statement that, "hopefully a sale to the State of Utah can be effectuated." The letter also refers
to the signers of the agreement and the power of attorney of Reed Bullock and sends copies of
the letter to all of the involved persons. Then details of the conclusion of the transaction were
contained in the check mailed to the Appellant on September 10, 1992 and cashed by him on
September 18, 1992, in which the total price was shown with the deduction for taxes and the
division of the net amount into four shares for four general partners, including the PlaintiffAppellant, and with a deduction from the Appellant's share for money owing to Reed Bullock
(Addendum 4). There is no indication of what additional knowledge Appellant could have
wanted to inform him as to the nature of the impending sale.
Ratification of the act of a partner can be measured by the following statement:
Ratification of a partner's unauthorized acts may be implied from the
partnership's acceptance of the benefits of the transaction in accordance
with the principle of agency that one who accepts or retains the benefits
or proceeds of the unauthorized acts of his agent, with knowledge of
material facts surrounding the transaction, is deemed to have ratified those
acts. 59A Am.Jur.2d, Partnerships, § 273.
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Contrary to Appellant's argument under Point C at pages 25 and 26, ratification results
in release from liability of the person whose acts are being approved. That is the holding of
Kidd v. Maldonado, 688 P.2d 461, which he cites. And the argument about confidential
relationship has nothing to do with ratification.

POINT n
DOES § 78-12-26(3), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953 AS AMENDED),
BAR ALL CAUSES OF ACTION EXCEPT 7 AND 10?
Appellant knew of the impending sale prior to January 13, 1992, because in that letter
he refers to a prior telephone conversation discussing the matter. In any event, he was notified
of the sale when he received the check and the voucher dated September 10, 1992, which he
cashed on September 18, 1992. An action filed in Federal Court May 24, 1994 was not served.
An Amended Complaint was filed and served September 18, 1994 and that action was dismissed
November 18, 1994. A Complaint was filed in the Third District Court of Utah on March 1,
1996, which was served on the first of the defendants on June 26, 1996.
Utah Code Annotated 78-12-26(3) provides that civil actions for fraud must be
commenced within three years after knowledge of the fraud is obtained. From September 10,
1992 to March 1, 1996, is obviously three years, five and one-half months. From January 13,
1992 to March 1, 1996 is obviously four years. If the commencement date is January 13, 1992
when the letter was written, the delay is obviously four years and one and one-half months.
It is Defendants-Appellees' position that the statute of limitations was not tolled by the
action in the Federal Court because the Court lacked jurisdiction and on that ground, the action
was dismissed. American Theater Co. v. Glasmann, 95 Utah 303, 308, 80 P.2d 922, holds that
9

the filing of an action in the City Court did not toll the statute of limitations because that court
lacked jurisdiction. The same rule should apply to an action in the Federal Court, which was
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Judge Peuler ruled in the Order attached to this Brief that the statute of limitations barred
all except causes of action 7 and 10.
In the District Court the Plaintiff-Appellant challenged application of U.C.A. §78-1226(3) to some of the causes of action because he alleged a conspiracy and not fraud as such.
These Defendants argued that conspiracy does not have a cause of action and that rather than
have the four-year statute of limitations under U.C.A. §78-12-25 apply, the statute relating to
the underlying basis of the conspiracy determined the application of the statute of limitations.
The trial judge ruled that the three-year statute applied because the conspiracy involved fraud.
This issue was resolved in Filmservice Laboratories, Inc. v. Harvey Bernhard Enterprises, 256
Cal.Rptr. 735 (Cal.App 2 Dist. 1989), where the court ruled that the statute of limitations for
conspiracy to commit fraud is the statute of limitations for fraud as follows:
It is established that no cause of action exists for conspiracy, per se.
Whether or not a cause of action for conspiracy is timely must be
determined by reference to the statute of limitations applicable to the
underlying cause of action (Kenworthy v. Brown (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d
298, 301, 56 Cal.Rptr. 461; 117 Sales Corp. V. Olsen (1978) 80
Cal.App.3d 645, 649, 145 Cal.Rptr. 778.) In this case the underlying
cause of action is for fraudulent conveyance, which we have found to be
time-barred. That being the case we find the fifth cause of action for
conspiracy is also time-barred. (Pg. 742)
A similar case is Schlotthauer v. Sanders, (Sup.Ct.App.Div. 1989) 545 N.Y.S.2d 197
(A.D. 2 Dept. 1989), in which as to the two causes of action which alleged a civil conspiracy
to defraud the plaintiff of a substantial interest in her property, the court held:
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The plaintiffs seventh and eighth causes of action, which allege civil
conspiracy, must similarly be dismissed, with prejudice, as time-barred
because conspiracy is not an independent tort, and is time-barred when the
substantive tort underlying it is time-barred {see, Williams v. Arpie, 44
N.Y.2d 689, 405 N.Y.S.2d 437, 376 N.E.2d 909).

POINT III

WERE THE ESTATE OF REED A. BULLOCK, DECEASED, AND
CLEO H. BULLOCK AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
REED A. BULLOCK ESTATE PROPERLY DISMISSED AS DEFENDANTS?
Appellant does not challenge this and Judge Peuler held that the Estate of Reed A.
Bullock and Cleo H. Bullock as personal representative should not be parties because the estate
has not been opened and there is no showing that there are any assets or that the estate ever will
be opened. This will be immaterial if this Court affirms Judge Peuler's Order.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff-Appellant was well-informed as to the nature of the pending sale to the State of
Utah of the Provo Canyon property. The documents, which are exhibits in the complaint, explain
fully the nature of the transaction. He discussed it on the telephone on January 2, 1992, and
reviewed it in his letter of January 13, 1992, in which his only question or criticism was that
he had not been a signer and the partnership had no right to sell the property and deed it away
without his signature. His letter and his telephone conversation did not challenge the selling of
the property but only trying to do so without his signature. He received the check in September
1992 with a full explanation of the disbursement of the proceeds, which check he deposited
within about five days with no protest of any kind. It wasn't until almost six months later that
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he apparently changed his mind and decided to make trouble. The trial judge properly held that
the sale was ratified upon these facts.
If the Court rules against the District Judge's Order on ratification, the application of the
statute of limitations must be addressed. It is submitted that the three-year statute applies on the
conspiracy to defraud and the fraudulent allegations in all of the causes of action except numbers
7 and 10, as ruled by the District Judge. A filing of the action in the Federal District Court,
which did not have jurisdiction, did not toll the statute. The filing of the action in March 1996
was well over three years after the check in payment was received and deposited and more than
four years after the Plaintiff-Appellant's letter of January 13, 1992.
The Order of the District Judge rules that the Estate of Reed Bullock and Cleo Bullock
as Personal Representative of that estate are not proper parties to the action.
DATED this lb

day of February, 1998.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP, a P.C,

Richard L. Bird, Jr.
^
Attorneys for Appellees Beatty and Bullock
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I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLEES BEATTY AND BULLOCK via United States Mail with postage prepaid thereon
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Kevin V. Olsen (Bar No. 4105)
ANDERSON & OLSEN, P.C.
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ADDENDUM

1.

U.C.A. § 78-12-26(3) (1953 as amended)

2.

Order of Summary Judgment

3.

Letter from Appellant to Alan W. Deardon dated January 13, 1992

4.

Partnership check in the amount of $67,198.43 together with a description of the sale
price of the property less taxes and a showing of how the remainder was divided into
four parts, one-fourth for each of the three general partners and one-fourth to the
Plaintiff-Appellant as a general partner, less the payment of a note plus interest due to
Reed Bullock by Plaintiff-Appellant, with a net check to Richard Bullock

5.

Contract dated in November, 1991, the offer to purchase the right of way, a full
description of the contract dated October 25, 1991, an illegible copy of a legal
description and a copy of an agreement of easement prepared in February 1988

Tabl

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur- 2CL — 13 Am. Jur. 2d Building and
Construction Contracts § 114.
/JUL — What statute of limitations govems action by contractee for defective or imr
proper performance ofwork by private building
contractor, 1 AX.R.3d 914.
^
Time of discovery as affecting running of
statute of limitations in wrongful death action,
49AL.R4th972.

Application of statute of limitations in private tort actions based on injury to persons or
property caused by underground flow of contaminants, 11 AX.R 5th 438.
Key Numbers. — Limitation of Actions <s=>
55(3).

78-12-26. Within three years.
An action may be brought within three years:
(1) for waste, or trespass upon or injury to real property; except t h a t
when waste or trespass is committed by means of underground works
upon any mining claim, the cause of action does not accrue until the
discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting such waste or
trespass;
(2) for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including actions for specific recovery thereof; except that in ail cases where the
subject of the action is a domestic animal usually included in the term
livestock," which at the time of its loss has a recorded mark or brand, if
the animal strayed or was stolen from the true owner without the owner's
fault, the cause does not accrue until the owner has actual knowledge of
such facts as would put a reasonable man upon inquiry as to the
possession of the animal by the defendant;
(3) *for relief on the ground of fraud or mista^a; exce.pt that the cause of
action in such case does not accrue until the discovery by t h e aggrieved
party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake;
(4) for a liability created by the statutes of this state, other than for a
penalty or forfeiture under the laws of this state, except where in special
cases a different limitation is prescribed by the statutes of this state;
(5) to enforce liability imposed by Section 78-17-3, except t h a t the cause
of action does not accrue until the aggrieved party knows or reasonably
should know of the harm suffered.
jHiirtory: L. 1951, ch- 58, § 1; c. 1943,
Bppp., 104-12-26; L, 1986, ch. 143, § 1; 1996,
& l 79, § 111.
aendment Notes. — The 1996 amendnt, effective April 29, 1996, in the introducr paragraph, substituted "An action may be
jjght within" for "Within"; deleted "An ac&*,at the beginning of Subsections (1) to (5),
l.made stylistic changes.

Cross-References. — "Action" includes special proceeding, § 78-12-46.
Livestock branding, Title 4, Chapter 24
Product Liability Act, statute of limitations,
§ 78-15-3
Right of action for waste, § 78-38-2
Three-year period for actions on insurance
contracts, § 31A-21-313.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

ting,
to personal property,
to real property
rule.

Fraud.
— In general.
— Application
— Running of statute
— Health care malpractice
Injury to real property
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Third Judicial Cicrict

MAY - 7 1997
SALT LAKE C0JN7"

KJWWA

Richard L. Bird, Jr., (UT Bar #0338)
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP, a P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants J. Vance Beatty,
Faye B. Beatty and Cleo H. Bullock
333 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2988
Telephone: (801) 328-8987

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD B. BULLOCK,
Plaintiff,
ORDER OF SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

vs.

THE STATE OF UTAH DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION, EUGENE H.
FINDLAY, CRAIG ZWICK, P. K.
MOHANTY, DEAN W. HOLBROOK,
ALAN W. DEARDON, J. VANCE
BEATTY, FAYE B. BEATTY, THE
ESTATE OF REED A. BULLOCK,
Deceased, THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF REED A. BULLOCK,
Deceased, CLEO H. BULLOCK,
CLEO H. BULLOCK, individually,
and DOES 1 through 50,
Inclusive,

Case No. 960901457CV
JUDGE SANDRA N. PEULER

Defendants.

3iT

X

2
The Motion to Dismiss of defendants Beatty and Bullock came before the Court
for argument on the 24th day of February, 1997, the said Motion being treated as a Motion for
Summary Judgment by the Court.
Following arguments by counsel the Court ruled that the Motion to Dismiss Cleo
Bullock as Personal Representative of the Estate of Reed A. Bullock was well taken and should
be granted; also that the position of the defendants that the causes of action for conspiracy
should have the same statute of limitations as the causes of action for simple fraud; that the
position of the defendants that Faye Beatty and Cleo Bullock were not limited partners was not
sufficiently certain and would be deferred, and that the claim of ratification of the agreement for
sale of the property involved was to be taken under advisement.
Thereafter and on April 3, 1997, the Court caused a Minute Entry to be made
containing the Court's ruling and based thereon, the Court finds as follows:
1.

The defendants' letter of January 13, 1992, together with the voucher on

the check delivered to the plaintiff on or about September 10, 1992, fully informed the plaintiff
as to the sale of the property and the division of the proceeds, including the payment made to
the plaintiff.
2.

Plaintiff took no action thereon until March 1993, giving no indication to

the defendants of nonacceptance of his share of the proceeds of the sale or any objection to the
sale having been made.

3n
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3.

Defendants distributed the proceeds of the sale and relied on the fact of

sale, there having been no objection made.
4.

It appears that Cleo H. Bullock was not appointed personal representative

of the estate of her deceased husband and there is an absence of proof that there was any
substantial estate of Reed A. Bullock.
5.

As to whether Faye Beatty and Cleo Bullock were limited partners of the

Bullock and Beatty Associates partnership, no ruling is made.
6.

The First and Second Causes of Action allege conspiracy to commit fraud

against the plaintiffs interest and specific allegations of fraud are contained in Causes of Action
3, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9, the Seventh Cause of Action alleging that the contract was void and the
Tenth Cause of Action alleging negligence.
7.

Allegations of fraud and unlawful activity are contained in the general

allegations of the Complaint in paragraphs 27, 28, 31(a), 31(c), 32, 33, 37, 38 and 40.
Based upon these findings, the Court concludes that:
1.

Cleo Bullock is not properly named as the personal representative of the

Estate of Reed A. Bullock.
2.

The question of whether Faye Beatty and Cleo Bullock were limited

partners is not sufficiently established by the pleadings and affidavits.

>SV

3.

The statute of limitations of three (3) years as to fraud is applicable to the

First and Second Causes of Action alleging conspiracy to commit fraud as well as to the
allegations of fraud per se.
4.

The information which the plaintiff had coupled with his inaction amounted

to ratification of the agreement and the sale of the Provo Canyon property.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED:
1.

Based upon ratification of the sale by the plaintiff, the entire Complaint

should be dismissed as to the defendants Beatty, the Estate of Reed A. Bullock and Cleo H.
Bullock individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Reed A. Bullock.
2.

Section 78-12-25, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as Amended) is also a bar

as to all the causes of action against these individual defendants except Causes of Action 7 and
10; and as to those two Causes of Action, no decision is made as there has not been sufficient
argument based upon the general allegations of the Complaint and their possible reference to
these two Causes of Action.
DATED this

"]

day of April; 1997.
BY THE COURT:

/^c^I'v'X
APPROVED AS TO FORM
this
day of April, 1997:

SANDRA N. PEULER, District Judge.

KEVIN V. OLSEN, Attorney for Plaintiff

b* {

5
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the foregoing proposed ORDER ON SUMMARY
JUDGMENT was served on the plaintiff this It

day of April, 1997, by mailing true and

correct copies thereof via United States Mail with postage prepaid thereon to:
Kevin V. Olsen, Esquire
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C.
Attorney for Plaintiff
306 West Main Street
American Fork, UT 84003-2230
Martha S. Stonebrook, Esquire
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for the State of Utah Dept. of Transportation,
Eugene H. Findlay, Craig Zwick, P.K. Mohanty, Dean W.
Holbrook, and Alan W. Dearden
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140856
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0856.

%
^/

JDK-C.VWP61\RLB\COURT\BEATTY.ORD
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Tab 3

Richard B. Bullock

40&.a54*4«

Attorney At Law
160 SARATOGA AVE
LOS GATOS,CA 95030

January 13, 1992

Alan W. Dearden
Utah Department of Transportation
Right of Way Division
4301 South 2700 West
Salt Lake City, Utah
84119-5998
Re:

Purchase from Bullock & Beatty, Associates,
A Limited Partnership, of 50.25+ acres in
Provo Canyon, Utah,

Dear Mr. Dearden:
You will recall in our telephone conversation of
January 2, 1992, I discussed with you the fact that I, a
general partner, had not signed any of the documentation
agreeing to sell the Provo Canyon real property to the
State of Utah. In addition, my mother's signature (also
a general partner) was signed through a power of attorney
that she gave to J. Vance Beatt$. Not only is the power bf
attorney flawed and defective in numerous areas, but my
mother's interest in the property is held in the Bullock
Family Trust of which the trustees are my brother, Steven
K. Bullock, my sister, Barbara Jane Maires, and myself.
Pursuant to our telephone
of the general partners 1 signatures
of the partnership property is sold
enclosed herein for your review and

conversation that alI
are required when al1
or transferred, I FaVe
inspection the following:

1. Limited Partnership Agreement of Bullock &
Beatty Associates, A limited Partnership.
Although this is not a fully executed copy, I am
sure that it is identical to the executed original, which I
believe J. Vance Beatty has in his possession.
You will note that I, Bert K. Bullock (my father,
who died in October 1 9 9 0 ) , Reed A. Bullock (my uncle) and
J. Vance Beatty (my uncle) are the general partners.
Before my f a t h e r s death, he and my mother, Marie
B. Bullock, established two trusts. The canyon property was
put into the trust of which my father was the trustee. As I

3

K1

Page Two
Alan W. Dearden
Re: BULLOCK & BEATTY ASSOCIATES
stated above, upon his death, my brother, Steven K. Bullock,
my sister, Barbara Jane Maires, and myself became the trustees
of that trust, it is called the Bullock Family Trust. Therefore, at this time, my mother can convey no ownership interest
in the property. We three trustees must do that.
As I stated above and in my telephone conversation
with you, all of the general partners must sign in order to
sell all of the partnership property. The Provo Canyon property
is all of the partnership property. You will note that Paragraph
2.4 states that restriction and provides in part:
2.4 Restriction on Powers of General Partners.
The General Partners may not without the consent
of all General Partners do any act in contravention of
this agreement or which would make it impossible to carry
on the ordinary business of tne partnership (my unaernningj
...; or assign or transfer any of the Partnership property
for oTKer than a Partnership purpose except to exchange 1
Partnership property for other property (my underlining).
Paragraph 2.3 entitled Powers,sets forth what a
majority of the partners may do in essentially the day-to-day
management and control of the partnership business. Nothing in
Paragraph 2.3 would override the provisions of Paragraph 2.4.
2. Copies of Sections 15009 and 15010, with annotations, from the California Corporations Code"!
These partnership code sections are taken from the
Uniform Partnership Act, which I believe, Utah has also
adopted.
You will note that these two sections require all
general partners to execute any document which would make it
impossible to carry on the ordinary business of the partnership.
The Provo Canyon property comprises the partnership and all of
its activities. Any transfer requires all general partners to
sign.
In conclusion, as I stated in my telephone conversation
with you, any sale of all of the Provo Canyon property owned by
Bullock & Beatty Associates, requires the signature of all of the
general partners -- not just Reed A. Bullock and J. Vance Beatty,
but, also, myself, and rather than my mother, Marie B. Bullock,
the three trustees of the trust in which her one-fourth interest
is held, who are my brother, Steven K. Bullock, my sister,
Barbara Jane Maires, and myself.

:XH!B!T 'tCn

?.2
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Page Three
Alan W. Dearden
Re: BULLOCK & BEATTY ASSOCIATES
I hope that this clarifies this particular issue,
If you have any questions, or if you require any additional
information that I might have, please let me know.
I have not yet received any information from you
and would appreciate receiving whatever you are able to provide so that hopefully a sale tq the State of Utah can be
effectuated.
Thank you,
Very truly^yours
< ^ <

RICHARD B. BULLOCK
RBB/kl
CC:

Marie B. Bullock.
Reed A. Bullock.
J. Vance Beatty.
Steven K. Bullock.
Barbara Jane Maires.

"EXHIBIT *C*

P. 3

^
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534

BULLOCK AND BEATTY ASSOCIATES e*o
BERT K. BULLOCK
261 NORTH 600 EAST 373-4283
PROVO, UTAH 84606

31-1/1240

Sept. 10

1Q92

I

I
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[
I

I
B

PAY

ffffSng3ICHA3D BUI LOCK

$ f 67 ,£98.43 _' j

t

Sixty Seven Thousand One Hundred Ninety Eight and *f 3/100
FtTSt

F,r* Security B*nko{ Utah

Security

S^S

n hie** Dm™*

S^

DPI i ARS ft
I

/s^ri

FOR Sale of Provo Canyon Property

^*

Ji

s^S^L^/frf

sw^
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Sale of Provo Canyon Property

$510,000.00

Less taxes to closing Date

691,62

Check received fron State of Utah in full

509,308.38

1/k

paid to Marie Bullock

1/k

paid to Seed A. Bullock

127,327.10

l/k

paid to J. Vnnce Beatty

127,327.10

$127,327.10

1/k phid to Richard 3ullock .. less
payment of note plus interest (due and payable
on sale of canyon property) to Reed Bullock
Paid to Richard Bullock

60,128.67
$67,198.^3

v^

Y

I

J?

/S^A,PJ/

I
"

" |
R

Tab 5

UTA
••utn
Station.

*o Station.

.Project No. J E z Q i l Q H
:f Highway

.Side.

-^t»

October 25, 1991

Parcel No.

m Q * i 3; T

ffnllork f, Bftattv associates
George,
i'tah
X.
VTarrancv Deed
4

M,V

l Cr

1PARTMENT OF T R A .
ORTATION
RIGHT OF WAY CONTRACT :ovo uvn

Q19:18:T

TVPf Of

«. Grantor.

426-1991

34770

deed fcr a tract cf lana fcr transocnaticn ourpeses

tNSTRUMtNT

delivered to

ever property described in said deed - H ± l L _ h £

Acquisition Agent

Alan Dearden
• M M * Of AGfNT

as escrow agent, with instructions ic deliver said deea TC

riTli

the Utah Department of Transportation, 4501 South 2700 West, 2nd Fleer North, Salt Lake City, Utah S4W9.
upon the delivery to said escrow agent, for the undersigned y~*«™
cf a ccpy cf this agreement
property executed and approved by the Department of Transportation.
N CONSIDERATION of the foregoing, ana other considerations n#f#»r>oh»r tot forth it is mufuoiiv ogreed Pv me p e n e s nereto as »o«iows.
' Soid tract or land is grontea free ana clear of all l«en* ana encumprances ono oortioi retooses tor iota troct or tono ihotl be furmsned to •<*•
r « o o r i m « m or Transportation, ana the totoi omounr in casn settlement snail bo oo»a to the grantor e*cept sucn portion tr*ereor as tne grantor may os*«gn to
3 'ton noioor m ootaming tne oortioi releases.
Z All wor« oono unotr ttvs ogreement snail conform to oil OPPiicoole buiidmg. tire ono sonitory lows oramances ono regulations reiotmg to swen WCK•
r-.o snoti Pe oono m o gooo ana w o m m o n m e monnor
3 All structures, improvements or otn«r facilities w n t n r t m o v M ana reiocotea or reconstrudea Ov i n * Deportment c* *'on*portotion tnan oe >e'» **- ot
?ooa conaition as tound.
4 No worn, improvement attorotion or motntenonce will b« oono or moat o«nor rhon or m odditton to tnot prov»oea tor m mis ogreement
5 Tho parties novo hmrm sot out th# wnote ot* thotr agreement. th« performance of this ogreement constitutes tn# entire cons»oerorion for ir-e gront ot
joid troct of iond ond shall relieve th* Deportment of Trontporrotion of oil further oPiigottont or ciotmt on that occounr. cr an account of the location, groao
and construction of tho proposed highway.
6. If ono wnen possession is taken Ov it of the soid tract of Iond hereinaoove referred to. the Oeoortment of Transportation snail comply wiin tne
following:

(A)

AMOUNT

Pay cash in f u l l to the grantors for the following:
An e n t i r e t r a c t of land containing 50.25± acres as
described in Warranty Deed 019:18:T and a l l improvements
and a l l water rights

$510,000.00

The Grantors agree to pay a l l 1991 property taxes a s s e s s e d
against parcel 18:T

^APPROVAL OF CONSTRUCTION ITEMS:
!BY

Total Cash Settlement $ 5 1 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0

DISTBIC7 DJUfCTQg

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this agreement the day and year first above written.
it is understoca by tho parties hereto that mis
instrument it on option until a p p r i s e d pv tne Director
cf Tron

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Approve A
Recommended for Approval

«oyr (wih^f
/r
<

*J . /JjlAji'.QjU^

SiGHT OF WAY ACQUISITION AGiNT

ZHltf
ItF. fi.GMr OF WAfr DIVISION

"*"•*

Aoorcved by
, *^-+<f
Utah DeDOfrm)ent
>eDanT»jer of Transportation _ ^ _ ^ ^ Z i
^

2t

<%^'

OAff

19

//

OtHSlT/S"

O.I

C*ANT0».

-ivd,

UTAH DEPARTMENT Z7 TRANSPORTATION
OFFER TO PURCHASE RIGHT OF 7AY

:-r::^c: ::c. r-cir-'zi.
7wner:

Parcel :ro. .i?:::;7

BULLOCK AND EEATTY ASSOCIATES

The Utah Department of Transportation hereby makes you an :ffer
of
$ 510,000.00
as the purchase price for the tract (s) of land described m Utah
Department of Transportation Project shown above. You are not
required to vacate your property until payment of the purchase
price has been made available to you.
Your signature en the Offer to Purchase is only for the purpose
of verification that such an offer has been made to you and does
not prejudice your right to have the final amount determined
through
condemnation proceedings in the event you do not accept the
Statefs offer. Information regarding your rights in Condemnation
proceedingsis explained in the brochure, "Your Highways and You",
presented to you at t&is time.
THIS IS NOT A CONTRACT TO PURCHASE BUT MERELY AND OFFER TO PURCHASE
FOR THE AMOUNT INDICATED ABOVE.
Date

O c f ZS,/f7;

fiv

,j)j A^JS-^
Acquisition Agent

(JUU^CJ)

Received a copy of the above offer this

R-~S4
7-on

EXHIBIT * 3 •

day of.

— -A DEPARTMENT '••** KANSL

'.ION

PROJECT: 7-015- 21%.

GRANTOR: 3ULIDCK AND BSATTY r.BZZZ .

PARCELS) *-rO. 019:IS:r
The following information is the basis for the amount estimated by the
Utah Department of Transportation to ce ;ust compensation.
(a)
Identification of the real property to be acquired: •'location,
before size, size of parcel to be acquired, after acquisition size)

Ownership Size:

50.25 ±,

TYPE OF INTEREST ACQUIRED
Warranty Deed

SIZE OF ACQUISITION
REMAINDER
SQ.FT/ACRE
LT/RT
PARCEL NO. 18 :T
50.25±,

(b)
Identification of improvements including fixtures which are to be
acquired.
BUILDINGS:
River Bend Trailer Park with all improvements
LANDSCAPING/YARD:
(c) Real property impr. including fixtures not owned by the owner of
the land.
NONE
'd) Impr. taken that will be replaced/or constructed as part of project.
NONE
'e)

Summary of fair market value:
1. Land
2 . Improvements . TRAILER PARK
3. Damages
4. Less Special Benefits
5.

TOTAL=

S285.000. 30
$225.000.J0
$
0
$
0.
£ 510.0CC.30

'f) The Utah Department of Transportation declares that this cffer is
the amount that has been established by the Department as just
compensation and is in accordance with applicable State laws and
requirements. Just compensation is defined as the fair market value of
the property taken, plus damages, if any, to the remaining property,
less any benefit which may accrue to said property by reason cf the
construction of the highway.
A

DATE: dd

ZS.rft}

R-62/Rev. 4/90

[jJU^

L^.s.KSunJj**

Right-of-Way Acquisition Agent

S i m i l a r t o 1m
10 t'tbk p g . /17

Wortuarly

; » i j . .JI~"..I..*. *v

Project

i»o.

~-0i?(31)

ILiuiitcu r a r u i ^ r y n i p )
l U t a h County

iiullocfc and L»-atty ASSL<:: ate-*,

: L i a i t t c l 1 a n ur r i a i i p ,

'Jranlors

a p e r p o t U ' : ' »M jtMuouC, «i»»*ii ;• ,«L O I c-.ti f - : - i i n : t;:ac-t •••- i/i'op^ruy, m Lna o&^./.V^
o t S e c t i o n .-.o, *. i» w*.f - . - • : . , />•;...;..< **. , i:? Clan o o u n i y , U t a h , ' i o r t n c
p u r p o s e -?L c.'f-'. f u c t i n . , '•.••••• 1 / u c i i i i ; , t ' - v - j n i . * ^ r . p i - i c i a * ;aiu M a i n t a i n i n g
:
tnereon,
trie r c i o c a r i o n •>£ r.ne S a l t
:. ike r.:|uc.iuct
nd a p p u r t e n a n t
parts
/
;
t n e r e o t iiicii»»-?ut t o tn-2 -?•»•••.» u^ti.vu o i ::ri •.\^.v ^^'..^/ .:.«;.*n • ••-> T r o j ^ c t *»o. u i ' J .
S a i u p a r r o l an eni.i** ? n - : t J S a :'.i:rip o i : : : nc »3.U ft:, wir.c i u j o i n i n j ^
nortneriy tne l o J i c ^ i a .
• v L ^ O O p o r t i o n '.»i tin* u o r t n - i / J y r i ^ n t o i way ana
l i m i t e d - a c c e s s * l i n e o i the* • i v .is^injj liijjhvay:
lisfzirmir.* at: - i«oir'. / ' , « : .'r # y.vi'i '!».•: i •••.•! \» J •, ' • . i - f ' J i n o r t h e r l y iroai l u e
o « n t e r l i n « '»]. *•* id p r r j ^ c i
•*• •£»:',!. ivs •.;•.• !.'t.?«.?o»i .".! 7 + J 5 . 0 0 , s a i d p o i n t o£
be;;\nt>in;; i s .-» r prox I ••.->t«H •• 3 / i I t . ••crtii >•••• . ' ' J f; . *.<..'-t *roc; fr.p c e n t e r of
s a i d S e c t i o n ±h; th«iit;.- . . •':.< .•1 | , )3 M V- • *•!*.«• Cl". •-•-• * p o i n t o t ^ t a r d e n c y w i t h
a y j i . ' w - C o o t raoiu-s •;«?rv- «.o t*.* l«-?t; t i n iie;« w e s t e r l y '•Ufc.Ui> £ c , more o r
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i l r r i v n (now .••.Dfii»«»or.o.d) • 'aie above
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.i.r-»v-- '•.».» .•»» i. , ir>»^. o r l e s s .
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Project :«o. l:-'Ji*(jl;

AGREEMENT FOR EASEMENT TO CONSTRUCT AND COVENANT TO MAINTAIN
(LIMITED PARTNERSHIP;
Utah County
Bullock ana Beacty Associates, a Limited Partnership, Grantors,
THIS AGREEMENT, made ana enterea into this
day of
_
A . D . ifc
, by ana between tne UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION, first party, at 4501 Soutn 2700 West, Salt Lake City, Utah,
84119, and_
,
a Limited Partnership of the State of
> second party.
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, incidental to the construction of an expressway by the first
party, the first party and the second party had agreed to deposit till
material in low areas of a certain tract of property owned by said secona
party* Saia fill material was placed in said areas mutually oenefiting both
first and secona parties.
The filling of portions of tne said property
resulted in the diminution and destruction of a wetlanas area, and,
WHEREAS, said destroyed wetlands area needs to be replaced in the near
vicinity of the former wetlanas area, ana,
WHEREAS, the tirst party desires to enter and construct the new wetlands
area facility upon the herematter described portion of said tract of
property, ana therearter withdraw from said tract after completing tne
replacement ana restoration of said wetlands, ana,
WHEREAS, the second party desires to perpetuate and maintain the new
wetlands area facility upon said tract of property.
NOW THEREFORE, the second party hereby GRANTS AtfD CONVEYS to the first
party, A TEMPORARY EASEMENT, upon parp of an entire tract of property, in the
SEtflW* ot Section 26, T. 5 S., R. 3 £ . , S.L.B.& M., in Utah County, Utah, for
the purpose of constructing thereon a wetlanas area facility ana appurtenant
parts thereof incident to the construction of an expressway known as Project
No. 019. The boundaries of said part of an entire tract are oescribea as
follows:
Beginning in the northerly limited-access line of U.S. highway 169 at the
Southwest corner of said entire tract, which point is approximately 1320 ft.
west and 230.00 ft. north from the center of said Section 26; thence
N. 26#25' E. 555.68 ft. ; thence N. 51*18" E. 195.70 ft.; thence d. 84#0i' L.
206.68 ft.; thence S. 5*59* E. 100.00 ft.; thence S. 84*01' W. 177.J2 ft.;
thence S. 51*18* W. 144.29 ft.; tnence S. 26*25* W. 436.74 rt. to the
northwesterly limited-access line of said highway; thence Southwesterly 67.12
ft. along said northwesterly
limited-access line, along the arc of a
951.474-foot raaius curve to the left, to the northerly limited-access line of
said highway (Note: Chord to said curve bears S. 50*4il09M W. tor a distance
of 67.11 ft.); thence N. 89*49 , 38 M W. (which equals property bearing due West)
30.74 ft. along said iioilfieiiy limited-access line to the point ol beginning.
The above described part of an entire tract contains 2.01 acre.
Saia temporary easement shall expire after said wetlands area facility is
constructed on the above described part of an entire tract at the expense or
the first party, said first party is therearter relievea of any further claim
or demana for costs, damages or maintenance charges which may accrue against
said wetlands area facility and appurtenant parts thereof.
AND THEREFORE, the second party, for themselves and tor their heirs,
assigns or successors in interest, AS A COVENANT running with the land in
perpetuity, agrees to maintain said wetlands area facility and its appurtenant
parts in good condition after the completion of the construction of saia
wetlanas area facility upon the hereinabove described part or an entire tract
of property.
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